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Abstract 
 
We estimate the benefits of intrastate and interstate geographic diversification for bank risk 
and return, and assess whether such benefits could be shaped by differences in bank size and 
disparities in economic conditions within states or across U.S. states. For small banks, only 
intrastate diversification is beneficial in terms of risk-adjusted returns but for very large 
institutions both intrastate and interstate expansions are rewarding. However, in all cases the 
relationship is hump-shaped for both intrastate and interstate diversification indicating limits 
for banks of all size. Moreover, we also find geographic expansion to reduce bank risk. Our 
results indicate that both small banks and very large banks could still benefit in terms of risk-
adjusted returns from further geographic diversification. Disparities in economic conditions as 
measured by the dispersion in unemployment rates either across counties or states impact the 
benefits of diversification. At initially low levels of intrastate diversification, expanding in 
new markets allows small banks to further reduce their risk in the presence of higher economic 
disparities. However, when they get more diversified, this effect is reduced.  
  
JEL Classification: G21, G28 
Keywords: Bank Holding Company; Geographic Diversification; Intrastate and interstate 
disparities in economic activity; Bank risk and return 
 
 
*
 Corresponding author: celine.meslier@unilim.fr (Céline Meslier), Tel: + 33 5 55 14 92 14.  
Don.Morgan@ny.frb.org (Donald P. Morgan) katherine.Samolyk@cfpb.gov (Katherine Samolyk), 
tarazi@unilim.fr (Amine Tarazi). 
  2 
 
The Benefits of Geographic Diversification in Banking 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We estimate the benefits of intrastate and interstate geographic diversification for bank risk 
and return, and assess whether such benefits could be shaped by differences in bank size and 
disparities in economic conditions within states or across U.S. states. For small banks, only 
intrastate diversification is beneficial in terms of risk-adjusted returns but for very large 
institutions both intrastate and interstate expansions are rewarding. However, in all cases the 
relationship is hump-shaped for both intrastate and interstate diversification indicating limits 
for banks of all size. Moreover, we also find geographic expansion to reduce bank risk. Our 
results indicate that both small banks and very large banks could still benefit in terms of risk-
adjusted returns from further geographic diversification. Disparities in economic conditions as 
measured by the dispersion in unemployment rates either across counties or states impact the 
benefits of diversification. At initially low levels of intrastate diversification, expanding in 
new markets allows small banks to further reduce their risk in the presence of higher economic 
disparities. However, when they get more diversified, this effect is reduced.  
 
JEL Classification: G21, G28 
Keywords: Bank Holding Company; Geographic Diversification; Intrastate and interstate 
disparities in economic activity; Bank risk and return 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
 Corresponding author: celine.meslier@unilim.fr (Céline Meslier), Tel: + 33 5 55 14 92 14.   
 
  3 
1. Introduction 
 
U.S. banks are not just becoming larger but also wider. The largest bank holding 
companies (BHCs) now operate across many states and many more banking markets within 
states. Similarly, smaller local banks are present in a larger number of counties than in the 
past. Compared to the vast literature on growing bank size or scale, the widening of U.S. 
banks and the potential diversification it provides has received relatively little attention. We 
document trends in geographic diversification for U.S. banks, and investigate how such 
diversification relates to bank risk and return. We contrast the effects of increasing scope—
geographic diversification—with increasing size, or scale and account for potential 
diversification benefits due to dissimilarities in economic conditions.   
Scale and scope refer to two very different but nevertheless interrelated dimensions. 
When banks get larger by merging with another bank in the same geographic location or some 
other location with nearly coincident fluctuations in economic activity, such an increase in 
scale is expected to lower average costs and may provide diversification across products. 
However, it will not provide any benefits incurred by geographic diversification. Indeed, 
geographic diversification benefits are associated to new investment opportunities in locations 
with different economic environments and non-synchronized fluctuations in economic 
activity. Geographically focused banks are much more exposed to changes in local economic 
conditions even when they hold a more diversified loan portfolio across a larger number of 
local consumers. Thus, scale is about spreading the costs of producing assets over fixed factors 
of production while geographic diversification is about spreading assets over locations with 
different patterns of returns.   
To look into geographic diversification, banks can be considered as a portfolio of loans 
and improved opportunities to diversify as an upward shift in the risk-return tradeoff facing a 
bank. However, an improvement in the risk-return tradeoff will not necessarily lead to lower 
risk; depending on their preferences, some banks may respond to the improved returns to risk-
taking by increasing risk, albeit with even greater returns. Whether overall risk goes up or 
down after diversification increases depends, in the end, on a bank’s appetite for risk. But 
whatever the actual portfolio choice along the improved risk-return tradeoff, risk-adjusted 
returns (i.e., returns per unit of risk) should be higher at more diversified banks. However, 
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potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders may induce additional costs of 
geographic expansion and hence shape the risk/return tradeoff of the bank. We therefore 
investigate the implications of geographic diversification in terms of risk and return but also 
more specifically in terms of risk-adjusted return. We measure bank geographic diversification 
using the FDIC’s annual Summary of Deposits, wherein banks report the amount of deposits at 
each and every branch in the U.S.. We calculate diversification measures for each banking 
firm across different markets, where ―markets‖ are defined variously as states, at one extreme, 
to individual MSAs (Metropolitan Statistical Areas) and rural counties, at the other. Using a 
sample of 6532 banks starting when diversification was allowed by the Interstate Banking Act 
of 1994 (Riegle-Neal) until the important changes driven by the 2007/2008 global financial 
crisis
1
, we estimate the relationship between geographic diversification, on the one hand, and 
risk, returns, risk-adjusted returns and default risk, on the other. Existing work considers the 
effects of geographic diversification either on the market value of listed BHCs (Deng and 
Elyasini, 2008, Goetz et al., 2013), i.e. large institutions or focuses on small banks located in 
one state (Goetz, 2012) or small community banks (Emmons et al., 2004). By considering the 
broadest possible sample of banks, our aim is to investigate the potential benefits of 
diversification at various size levels and multiple geographic dimensions encompassing the 
case of a small bank initially operating in a single county or MSA and reaching for new 
business only a few miles away to the largest institutions spreading across states and 
internationally. In contrast to micro papers that focus on distance between headquarter and 
branches (Deng and Elyasini, 2008) or analyze the dynamics of either intrastate branching 
deregulation (Goetz, 2012) or interstate bank deregulation (Goetz et al., 2013), our aim is to 
account for heterogeneity in economic conditions within states at the county level and across 
states nationwide. Specifically, we assess how disparities in economic conditions and business 
cycles within or across states impact the risk-return outcomes of geographic expansion.  
Our results show that for small banks, only intrastate diversification is beneficial in 
terms of risk-adjusted returns but for very large institutions both intrastate and interstate 
expansions are rewarding. Intrastate expansion also improves the risk/return tradeoff of 
                                                          
1
 We start our investigation in 1994 to capture the diversification trends following the Interstate Banking Act of 
1994 and end it in 2006 to avoid disruptions brought by the global financial crisis. For further insights, we also 
separately consider the 2007-2008 period.   
  5 
systemic banks but we do not highlight any significant effect of interstate diversification. 
However, in all cases the relationship is hump-shaped for both intrastate and interstate 
diversification indicating limits for banks of all size. Moreover, we also find geographic 
expansion to reduce bank risk. Our results indicate that both small banks and very large bank 
could still benefit in terms of risk-adjusted returns from further geographic diversification. 
While intrastate expansion affects the risk/return tradeoff of systemic banks, the marginal 
effect is not significant. Disparities in economic conditions as measured by the dispersion in 
unemployment rates either across counties or states impacts the benefits of diversification. At 
initially low levels of intrastate diversification, expanding in new markets allow small banks to 
further reduce their risk in presence of higher economic disparities. However, when they get 
more diversified, this effect is reduced. At the other extreme, for very large banks, higher 
economic disparities impact the benefits of diversification, but the marginal effect is not 
significant.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our work to 
previous literature and discusses our research focus. Section 3 presents the data and section 4 
our empirical model and results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.   Related literature and research focus 
 
In our study we focus on the U.S., where there has been a distinct shift toward more 
interstate mergers after 1994. Such a shift followed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act that enabled banks to acquire banks in another state without that 
state’s permission. In general, the laws that limited banks’ geographic reach have gradually 
eased over the last decades. Starting in the 1970s, individual states began letting banks branch 
across their own state, and groups of states, or compacts, allowed interstate bank mergers 
among the states in the compact. In 1982, BHCs were allowed (by the Garn-St. Germain Act) 
to buy failed banks in any state, regardless of state laws. Before 1994, virtually all mergers 
involved two banks in the same state, often a healthy bank buying a failing one. The Interstate 
Banking Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal) enables BHCs to buy any bank—healthy or not—in any 
state. Intrastate mergers and bank failures both trailed off in 1994, when interstate mergers 
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accelerated. Both sorts of mergers make banks larger, of course, but interstate mergers tend to 
make them wider as well.
2
 The number of U.S. commercial banks has sharply declined since 
the mid 1980's, and the assets of the average bank more than tripled since1984. This increase 
in bank size and the potential returns to scale is one of the most studied aspects of bank 
consolidation.
3
 Until recently, researchers agreed that bank returns are a hump-shaped function 
of assets and that economies of scale turn into diseconomies before assets reach the multi-
billion dollar range. Peristiani (1997) estimates the profit-maximizing level of assets (efficient 
scale) to be between $300 million to $900 million. According to these figures the average 
bank may now be operating above efficient scale. McAllister and McManus (1993) and 
Wheelock and Wilson (2001) find that banks face increasing returns to scale up to at least 
$500 million of total assets. More recent papers, however, (Feng and Serletis, 2009; Wheelock 
and Wilson, 2012) find contrasting results. For instance, Wheelock and Wilson (2012) show 
that most banking organizations, including the largest holding companies, operated under 
increasing returns to scale over the 1984-2006 period. With their focus on scale, researchers 
have largely ignored the potential geographic diversification benefits of consolidation in the 
banking industry.
4
 This disinterest may be partly theory based; investors can hold shares in 
banks all over the country, so they may not need banks to diversify themselves. Shareholders 
may even penalize diversification at the firm level if it reduces pressures on managers to 
perform well. The diversification ―discount‖ for non-financial firms (where the whole firm is 
                                                          
2
 Our aim in this paper is not to study mergers. Mergers refer to how banks get bigger or wider. We are interested 
in what happens (to risk and returns) as banks grow. 
3
 See Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) for an overview of the causes and consequences of consolidation. 
There is also an extensive literature on mergers and potential scale benefits. Rhoades (1994) counted 39 bank 
merger-efficiency studies between 1980 and 1993 in the U.S. and DeYoung et al. (2009) review 150 studies 
conducted worldwide after 2000 on bank mergers more generally. In the efficiency studies reviewed by Rhoades, 
mergers rarely lead to lower average costs, even when the merger is between banks with overlapping markets, 
where the potential cost savings are the largest. The early studies tend to focus on the potential cost benefits, in 
part because bank consultants and managers emphasize costs savings. Roughly half of the studies look at market 
prices, testing whether the price of the merging banks' stock increases near the merger. The other half look 
directly at the bank's performance, to see if cost performance actually improves following the mergers. Despite 
the differences in methodology, the results from both types of studies have mostly pointed negative effects; on 
average, the combined stock prices of the merger banks do not increase following mergers, nor does the cost 
performance of the merging banks improve. Performance fails to improve even when there is large degree of 
market overlap, or a large efficiency gap between the acquiring bank and its target. A small number of case 
studies of mergers suggest reasons why costs may not improve. 
4
 Dietsch and Oung (2001) draw a similar conclusion from their study of bank mergers in France: "… market-
driven merger strategies based on cost synergies do not seem to be empirically justified.  On the other hand, there 
seems to be an underused potential for income synergies and risk diversification gains."  
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worth less than its parts) suggests that investors prefer focused firms with managers that stick 
to their core business. Laeven and Levine (2007) find a similar diversification discount in the 
case of the banking industry, indicating that economies of scope are not sufficiently large to 
produce a diversification premium and to outweigh the costs associated to agency problems. 
Diversification is however a core business in banking and therefore it seems plausible to 
expect some upside for banks that are better diversified. Diversification at the bank level may 
also improve banks’ investment decisions if diversification smoothes internal cash flows (via 
internal capital markets) and helps banks avoid external funding (Houston, James, and Marcus 
1997).  
While geographic diversification may provide some benefits, spreading across markets 
is not costless, of course. When opening branches in a new county or a new state, banks face 
learning costs due to the lack of information on this new market. These costs can be 
particularly high for banks which specialize in relationship lending such as community banks. 
As banks geographically expand and therefore become larger, collecting soft information 
becomes more costly as the distance between the lender and the borrower increases and the 
transmission of this information across the different management layers becomes more 
difficult. Moreover, getting wider puts distance between principals (executives and owners) 
and agents (management) and hence wider banks may face higher agency costs. Costs 
associated to geographic diversification could hence be different for banks with different 
business models. As discussed in Stein (2002), lending technologies based on soft information 
will face decreasing returns to scale but lending technologies relying on hard information can 
be more easily scaled up. 
5
 
Though neglected, researchers have not ignored geographic diversification entirely. In 
their study of listed BHCs, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) find that the largest BHCs were more 
diversified across census regions, and that such diversification was associated with lower stock 
return volatility. Among Italian banks, Acharya et al (2006) find that geographic 
diversification improves the risk return tradeoff, at least for relatively safer banks. Assessing 
the effects of geographic expansion on bank efficiency with a sample of 7000 banks from 
                                                          
5
 Loutskina and Strahan (2011) highlight changes in the lending behavior of concentrated lenders (banks which 
operate in one or a few local markets and invest in private information).When they expand beyond their core 
market, concentrated lenders behave more like diversified lenders (banks which operate in many markets and use 
public information) in their newly attained markets.   
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1993 to 1998, Berger and DeYoung (2001) find contrasting results. On the one hand, 
expansion to nearby states or regions tends to positively affect bank efficiency. But, on the 
other hand, they find that inefficiencies tend to increase with the distance between a bank 
holding company’s headquarters and its subsidiaries, presumably because the managers at a 
faraway subsidiary have more leeway for mismanagement or shirking. Benefits of geographic 
expansion are therefore lower when banks move further away, and this effect is stronger for 
small banks (less than $100 million in assets). The negative impact of distance is also reported 
by Deng and Elyasiani (2008) in terms of higher diversification discount and higher risk. 
Using a sample of 500 BHC listed banks, the authors analyze the link between geographic 
diversification and BHC value and risk by focusing on the distance between headquarters and 
branches. While increased geographic diversification enhances bank value and reduces risk, 
larger distance generates a diversification discount and higher risk. Hence, the diseconomies 
associated with distance may limit the gains from geographic diversification. Goetz et al. 
(2013) also find a negative relationship between geographic diversity, following interstate 
bank deregulation, and BHC value. According to the authors, this result could reflect agency 
costs; larger diversity makes it more difficult for outside investors to control insiders which 
allows them to extract larger private benefits from the bank. Nevertheless, by further exploring 
the potential benefits of technological progress in the banking industry, Berger and DeYoung 
(2006) highlight how these changes have facilitated the geographic expansion of U.S. banks 
by reducing distance-related agency costs and by improving the control of parent banks on 
their subsidiaries. Benefits of geographic diversification could also result from higher 
competition in local banking markets. As highlighted by Evanoff and Ors (2008), geographic 
deregulation in the U.S. had a positive effect on bank efficiency. By increasing competition on 
local markets, entry of new competitors, through mergers and acquisitions, leads incumbent 
banks, not involved in the process, to reduce their costs and hence improve their cost 
efficiency. Moreover, bank diversification could also impact the risk-taking behavior of local 
non-diversified competitors. Indeed, Goetz (2012) highlight that bank diversification tends to 
increase bank risk-taking but lowers competitors' risk-taking.    
These papers do not explore the potential benefits of entering new markets with non-
synchronized fluctuations in economic conditions. When banks are geographically focused, 
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they are much more exposed to changes in local economic conditions even when they hold a 
more diversified loan portfolio across a larger number of local customers. However, although 
portfolio theory would predict that geographically concentrated banks would be riskier than 
geographically diversified banks, there is no clear-cut empirical evidence on the vulnerability 
of U.S. banks' to local economic shocks. Meyer and Yeager (2001) do not find a significant 
link between bank performance and local economic conditions. Moreover, focusing on 
community banks located in a single county, Yeager (2004) does not find local economic 
shocks (which are independent from state or nationwide economic conditions) to 
systematically impair bank performance. If banks are not actually affected by local economic 
shocks, the potential benefits of geographic diversification, particularly for community banks 
may be questioned. Using a technique of simulating mergers, Emmons et al. (2004) investigate 
the ability of small community banks (i.e. with a total assets less than $400 million USD) to 
reduce default risk through scale effects and geographic diversification. The authors conclude 
that benefits of geographic diversification for small community banks are small. As 
idiosyncratic risk dominates local market risk in small community banks, they could reduce 
failure risk through increasing size, by acquiring other banks in the same market they operate. 
However, for small community banks located in urban markets, benefits of geographic 
diversification are greater, reflecting higher heterogeneity in economic conditions across U.S. 
urban areas than rural areas.  
The 2008 global financial crisis has renewed the debate on the potential dark side of 
geographic diversification through spillover effects of local economic shocks by multi-market 
banks. As pointed out by Morgan et al. (2004), the extent to which geographic expansion 
reduces or increases the exposure to state-level economic volatility depends on whether loan 
demand shocks versus loan supply shocks predominate on the local market. When large loan 
losses occur on a local market, the presence of multi-market banks will reduce the sensitivity 
of the local market to such shocks. Multi-market banks could indeed maintain lending either 
because they have greater access to capital markets than single-market banks or because they 
can shift funds from their other markets. On the other hand, in the presence of demand-side 
shocks, such as a reduction in local borrowers’ creditworthiness or a reduction in local loan 
demand, the behavior of multi-market banks will tend to amplify local shocks. As the 
  10 
perceived profitability of local lending decreases, multi-market banks will shift funds to the 
other markets where they operate. Evidence of a positive effect of geographic expansion are 
found by Strahan (2003), Becker (2007) and Keeton (2009), supporting the view that the shift 
to multi-market banking has reduced the overall sensitivity of bank lending to local economic 
shocks. However, investigating the effects of the housing market collapse in 2007-2008, 
Berrospides et al. (2013) find evidence of spillover effects of local economic shocks by multi-
market banks.  
  Our aim is to investigate whether greater geographic diversification has been associated 
with higher risk-adjusted returns and to what extent banks’ choices have impacted their default 
risk. As geographic diversification and size are different but interrelated dimensions, we 
investigate whether the benefits of getting wider differ across bank size. We expect a positive 
relationship between diversification and risk-adjusted returns, but the relationship at one or the 
other extreme (the initial step away from mono-market banking or the giant step towards 
nationwide banking) is undetermined. Moreover, spreading across counties and across states is 
motivated by developing banking activities in locations with different economic environments 
and non-synchronized fluctuations in economic conditions. Disparities in local economic 
conditions should be beneficial and therefore taken into account when assessing the effect of 
geographic diversification on banks' risk-adjusted returns. We expect risk-adjusted return to be 
improved by intrastate geographic diversification when economic disparities within the state 
increase. Consequently, bank default risk might be lower if banks do not switch towards 
riskier strategies. We also expect the same effect for interstate diversification when economic 
disparities across states are higher. However, at its first stages, bank diversification is more 
likely to occur in adjacent counties/states with similar patterns of returns (Emmons et al. 
(2004)). Consequently, the risk-return tradeoff might not be improved at the first stages of 
geographic diversification and the full benefits might only occur when banks reach more 
distant markets with less correlated economic conditions. Conversely, as argued above and 
supported by recent literature, the agency and learning costs induced by distance could also 
limit the potential benefits of moving to distant markets.  
 
3. Data  
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3.1 Data and sample  
Data are obtained from two main sources: Call Reports and FDIC’s Summary of 
Deposits (SOD). The measures of geographic diversification used in this paper are based on 
bank branches' deposit dispersion as in Deng and Elyasiani (2008), Goetz et al. (2013) and 
Goetz (2012). 
The initial sample of banks includes both BHC and banks which are not affiliated to a 
BHC and is an unbalanced panel of 10681 banks with a total of 92550 annual observations. In 
our main investigation we use data spanning from 1994 to 2006, starting with the Interstate 
Banking Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal) and ending before the global financial crisis triggered in 
2007 to avoid atypical disruptions. Nevertheless, we also conduct estimations during the peak 
of the crisis by separately considering the 2007-2008 period. We measure all variables at the 
holding-company level, i.e. we treat all the commercial banks affiliated with a holding 
company as a single entity.6 Measuring the variables at the individual bank level would ignore 
the diversification provided via affiliation with banks in other locations. We exclude credit 
card banks, wholesale banks, or other special purpose entities. Diversification may matter for 
such institutions, but because they do not operate deposit networks, deposit data are not a good 
proxy of geographic diversification.7 We exclude banks that have not filed Call Reports for at 
least five years. To take bank mergers and acquisitions into consideration, we identify banks 
whose total assets have grown by more than 30% between any two consecutive years (t-1 and 
t)8 and construct a dummy variable which is equal to 1 in year t and the two following years 
(that we consider as a transitory period) and equal to 0 elsewhere. We conduct all our 
estimations excluding these three-year windows because we use the time dimension to 
compute some of our risk measures (rolling-window standard deviations).  
                                                          
6
 We aggregate data for commercial banks that are affiliated with the same holding company into BHC-level 
measures for each ―market‖. For commercial banks that are the holding company (i.e., the only commercial bank 
affiliate), the BHC and bank data are the same.  
7
 To identify wholesale banks, we use information reported for the purposes of the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) that identifies whether an institution is considered a wholesale bank in the context of CRA assessments. 
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and CRA data are calendar year data. Here we also use year-end 
BHC data. Since the Summary of Deposits (SOD) data are reported for June of each year, we merger adjust these 
data to reflect the year-end bank and BHC-affiliates status before constructing our geographic diversification 
indices.   
8
 To identify banks involved in mergers, we follow a criterion similar to that of Stiroh and Rumble (2006). They 
exclude from their sample observations for banks that have experienced a growth in total assets higher than 20% 
between two consecutive periods.  
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3.2 Diversification measures and their trends 
Geographic diversification for bank
9
 i in year t, GEODIVit, equals:  
 
GEODIVit = 1 - j (Depositsj /Total deposits)
2
 
  
Where Depositsj measures the deposits of bank i in location j at time and Total deposits, the 
total deposits of bank i at time t. 
 The GEODIV indexes vary between 0—a bank with all its deposits in branches in the 
same location—to one—a bank with its deposits spread widely across branches in (infinitely) 
many locations. The branch level data on deposits are from the annual Summary of Deposits 
collected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Note that we are using deposits as a 
proxy for lending; deposits are not a perfect proxy for loans. Unfortunately U.S. banks do not 
report comprehensive information on where they lend.
10
    
We measure geographic diversification at two different levels of detail on location. The 
first and finest measure, GD1 counts individual Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSAs) and all 
non-MSA counties as 2600 separate entities. This measure corresponds to the ―local market‖ 
concept used in antitrust analysis and the literature on market structure and performance. The 
second measure, GD2, counts states as separate entities, with MSA and non-MSA counties 
within each state lumped together. In comparison with previous studies on geographic 
diversification, which either focus on the diversification behavior of listed banks (Deng and 
Elyasiani (2008) and Goetz et al. (2013) or on the effect of intrastate diversification on (small) 
banks located in one state (Goetz (2012)), our aim is to provide a broad picture of bank 
geographic diversification and to investigate the effect of both intrastate and interstate 
diversification of U.S. banks. Comparing the relationship between each measure and risk and 
                                                          
9
 Unless otherwise noted, in the rest of the paper, we use interchangeably the words bank and BHC. 
10
 Banks do report application-level data on home mortgage applications, but many home mortgages are sold in 
the secondary mortgage market instead of being held in the originating bank’s portfolio. Banks also report census 
tract-level data on small loans originated to businesses and farms. However, small banks are not required to 
report these data. 
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returns will reveal whether the gains from diversification come from spreading across states, 
or whether there are also gains from spreading within states as well.    
Table 1.1 highlights a strong heterogeneity of geographic diversification behavior 
across time.  
Insert Table 1.1 
 
The average U.S. bank has become wider since 1994. The mean of GD1, the 
geographic diversification index over individual MSAs and rural counties, increased from 
0.104 in 1994 to 0.190 in 2006. The broader measure of diversification GD2 also increased 
very sharply indicating stronger interstate expansion during the period. In 2006, more than 50 
percent of the banking institutions in our sample still operate in a single county and more than 
75 percent in a single state. 
A look at the whole sample of banks over the period shows that on average, more than 
half of the banks conduct their activities in a single county and more than 90% are located in a 
single state.  
 To disentangle the effect of geographic diversification and size within relatively 
homogenous bank subsets, we assess the effect of geographic diversification on the risk-return 
tradeoff using four sub-samples of banks. Following the literature, small banks are those with 
total assets below or equal to $1 billion. Most of them are community banks, roughly defined 
in the literature as institutions with total assets below $1 billion and that are essentially 
focused on relationship lending (see DeYoung et al., 2004 for a survey on this question).
11
 
During the second part of the 1990s, a broad process of consolidation occurred in the U.S. 
banking industry during which most mergers involved two community banks or had a 
community bank as a target (DeYoung and Hunter, 2003). Despite this process which lead 
both to an increase in average bank size
12
 and to a reduction in community banks' market 
share, community banks still play an important role in relationship lending to small businesses. 
We consider a subset of large banks, (total assets above $1 billion and below $10 billion) and 
                                                          
11
 As pointed out in DeYoung et al. (2004), bank size is not the only criterion to take into account to characterize 
an institution as a community bank; geographic concentration (single county for the smallest or single state for 
the largest), range of services and ownership structure (independent and domestically-owned) have also been 
taken into account to define a financial institution as a community bank. 
12
 The number of U.S. banks with assets below $1 billion declined from 14078 in 1980 to 7631 in 2001 and their 
market share fell from 33.4% to 16%.  
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a subset of very large banks (total assets equal of above $10 billion). After the 2008 financial 
crisis the Federal Reserve has distinguished very large and systemically important institutions 
from other large banks with a threshold of $50 billion (FED, 2011). We hence also consider a 
sub-sample of systemic banks (total assets of $50 billion and above). In line with the literature 
on the scale benefits of consolidation which highlights rapid diseconomies before assets reach 
the multi-billion dollar range, we expect the benefits of intrastate and interstate geographic 
diversification to be different at one or the other extreme in terms of bank size. 
 
 3.3 Bank profitability and risk measures 
 
To measure bank profitability, we use the return on assets (ROAit) and the return on 
equity (ROEit): 
 
 
 
 To measure bank risk-taking we use the standard deviation of the return on assets, 
(SdROAit) and the standard deviation of the return on equity, (SdROEit) computed on a rolling 
window of 3 years.13  
To measure risk-adjusted return we compute the ratio of ROAit to its standard deviation 
SdROAit, RaROAit and the ratio of ROEit to its standard deviation SdROEit, RaROEit:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
The rolling windows cover for year t, year t and the previous two years (t-1) and (t-2).   
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We also consider a measure of bank default risk by computing a 3-year rolling Z-score defined 
as:    
 
 
where EQUITY is the ratio of Total equity to Total assets;   and  are backward 
moving averages of ROA and EQUITY on a 3-year rolling window. The Z-score indicates the 
number of standard deviations that a bank’s ROA has to fall below its expected value before 
equity is depleted. Thus, a higher value of Z is associated with a lower default probability.  
 In our regressions, we exclude observations below the 1
st
 and above the 99
th
 percentile of 
our bank profitability, risk-adjusted returns and bank risk measures to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. We hence end up with a panel of 6532 banks and a total of 65381 observations. 
 
3.4 Indicators of disparities in economic conditions within/across states  
 To assess whether banks actually benefit from disparities in economic conditions when 
they spread their activities in new markets across counties and states, we construct indicators 
of economic disparities within and across states.  
To compute these indicators, we use annual information on county-level and state-level 
unemployment rates. A higher dispersion in the unemployment rate within the state or across 
states measured at a given date is used as a proxy of higher economic disparities within the 
state/across states. Our measure of 'within-state' economic disparities, SdUnempStst, is the 
dispersion of unemployment rates across the counties of a given state s at time t. Similarly, our 
measure of 'across-states' economic disparities, SdUnempCtryt, is the dispersion of 
unemployment rates across U.S. states at time t. The measure of dispersion we use is the 
standard deviation of the unemployment rate at a given date. 
Interacting these indicators with the diversification variables (GD1it*SdUnempStst and 
GD2it*SdUnempCtryt) aims to capture the impact of larger disparities in economic conditions 
within and across states on the benefits of geographic diversification. We expect the benefits 
of geographic diversification to be higher in the presence of larger disparities. Because we do 
not know the composition of the bank’s loan portfolio and hence the geographic location of its 
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customers, our state-level indicator is matched with our bank-level geographic diversification 
measures according to the location of the bank’ headquarter. 
 
3.5 Other explanatory and control variables 
Other bank-specific variables are included as control variables (CONTROLit), to 
account for differences in portfolio diversification and functional diversification. Two product 
diversification indexes (LOANit and FOREIGNit) and one functional diversification index 
(INCOMEit) are computed. Diversification indexes across the major loan categories (LOANit), 
across foreign and domestic loans (FOREIGNit), and across interest and non-interest income 
sources (INCOMEit) for each bank, i, in each year, t, are measured analogously: 
 
LOANit = 1 - 
j
j=1-6 (Loansj /Total loans)
2
 
 
FOREIGNit = 1 – ((Foreign loans/Total loans)
2 
+ (Domestic loans/Total loans)
2
) 
 
INCOMEit =   1 – ((Non-interest income/Income)
2 
+ (Interest income/Income)
2
) 
 
Loan diversification (LOANit) is measured across the six major loan categories 
(Loansj) reported in the Call Reports: commercial and industrial, commercial real estate, home 
mortgages, consumer, agricultural, and other. The non-interest activities measured by 
INCOMEit include any fee-generating activities by banks (as opposed to interest), e.g. 
underwriting, payment services, trading activities.... Radecki (1999) documents the sizable 
shift toward such activities, especially by larger banks. Stiroh (2004a and b), Stiroh (2006) and 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006) report that a higher share of non-interest income in total income 
positively affects the volatility of bank returns inducing higher risk. In principle, foreign 
diversification (FOREIGNit) should operate on risk and return in the same way as domestic 
diversification across the U.S.. We also include liquidity risk LIQUID_RISKit, (Core 
deposits/Total assets), leverage, EQUITYit, (Total equity/Total assets) and Credit risk, 
CRED_RISKit, (Net charges off of loans and leases/Total loans)
14
 in the estimations.  
                                                          
14
 We also run regressions from which CRED_RISKit is excluded from the set of explanatory variables.   
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Dummy variables are also included to identify the main bank loan specialization 
(agricultural loan, mortgage specialists, consumer-oriented…) and to distinguish some specific 
types of banks (banks which are part of a holding company from independent banks and 
agricultural lending institutions). We also take into account the specific characteristics of our 
sample regarding geographic diversification/concentration. Because more than half of the 
banks in our sample operate in a single county and more than 90% are located in a single state, 
we include in our estimations two dummy variables which take the value of 1 if the bank is 
located in a single county or a single state respectively. We also include time effects. Finally, 
while these time effects are constant across banks but could differ across states, we also add 
the growth rate of the real gross domestic product of state s at time t (GROWTHst) and the 
standard deviation of the unemployment rate within the state where the bank’s headquarter is 
located (SdUnempStst) to account for differences in economic conditions across U.S. states. 
Tables 1.2 to 1.6 provide descriptive statistics for the whole sample and for our four 
sub-samples (small banks, large banks, very large banks and systemic banks).  
 
Insert Tables 1.2 to 1.6  
 
The descriptive statistics highlight a strong heterogeneity across banks in terms of 
geographic expansion. More than 50% of small banks are located in a single county and more 
than 90% operate in a single state only. Conversely, almost all very large banks are located in 
more than one state. In between, more than half of large banks are present in more than one 
state. 
The correlation matrices among our major variables highlight a positive correlation 
between geographic diversification and size as one would expect (Tables 2.1 and 2.2).  
  
Insert Tables 2.1 and 2.2  
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To deal with co-linearity issues, we orthogonalize the logarithm of total assets, with each of 
our two geographic diversification indexes and use the residuals as our bank size proxy 
(SIZE).
 15
  
 
4. Econometric methodology and results 
 
4.1 Econometric methodology 
Our baseline model is as follows: 
                                                                                                                                         
(1) 
 
 Yit is either a measure of profitability, risk-adjusted return, risk-taking or default risk of 
bank i at time t, GEODIVit is one of the two indicators of geographic diversification of bank i 
at time t (GD1it or GD2it) and SIZE it is an indicator of bank size of bank i at time t. We use 
our bank size measure from which the impact of geographic diversification has been pulled 
out. Each geographic diversification index is separately included as well as its squared value; 
we also interact the geographic diversification index and its squared value with its 
corresponding (state-level or nationwide) measure of disparities in economic conditions, 
SDUNEMPt (SdUnempStst or SdUnempCtryt). These interaction terms capture the influence of 
within/across states disparities in economic conditions on the benefits of geographic 
diversification. The intrastate geographic diversification index (GD1it) is interacted with 
SdUnempStst, our state-level indicator of economic dispersion which measures the dispersion 
of unemployment rates across the counties of a given state, s, at time t. The interstate 
geographic diversification index (GD2it) is interacted with SdUnempCtryt, our country-level 
indicator of economic dispersion, which measures the dispersion of unemployment rates 
across U.S. states at time t. αi and αT are respectively the individual effects  and time-specific 
effects.  
 Our baseline model accounts for possible U or humped shaped relationships between 
geographic diversification and the dependent variable (either profitability, risk-adjusted return, 
                                                          
15
 For example, when considering geographic diversification across rural and MSA counties, GD1, we regress the 
logarithm of total assets on GD1 and use the residuals as a proxy of size. 
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risk-taking or default risk) at different levels of size and economic conditions. As argued 
above, while spreading across new markets should be beneficial in terms of risk-adjusted 
return (portfolio diversification gains), it could also have some negative effects due to larger 
distance from headquarters (information costs and agency costs). Moreover, differences in size 
and business model could also impact geographic diversification benefits. Lending 
technologies which rely on soft information are less extendable than those based on hard 
information. Hence, when expanding beyond their core market, small banks and more 
specifically community banks specialized in relationship lending may face higher costs than 
larger banks which rely on transaction-based lending technologies.  
 In order to assess whether the benefits of geographic diversification outweigh its costs, 
we estimate the marginal effect of geographic diversification i.e. the first derivative of Yit with 
respect to the geographic diversification index (GEODIVit): 
 
                             
(2) 
 
    The value of the marginal effect of geographic diversification on Yit is computed using 
the average value of the geographic diversification indicator ( ) and of the disparities 
of economic conditions ( ). 
 
We run the regressions using a fixed effects model and regression errors are clustered 
at the bank level. We first estimate a model including only the geographic diversification 
indicator and its squared-value and include in a second step the interaction terms between the 
geographic diversification index and our indicators of economic disparities. In each step, we 
conduct estimations on the whole sample and on our four different sub-samples (small banks, 
large banks, very large banks and systemic banks).  
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The estimation results are reported in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6.16 
 
 
4.2 Geographic diversification and size 
 Considering the whole sample of banks (Table 3), we first highlight a hump-shaped 
relationship between geographic diversification and risk-adjusted returns. Whatever its scope, 
geographic diversification improves the risk-return tradeoff of U.S. banks over the period 
under study.   
At first stages of diversification, spreading across counties (GD1) or across states (GD2) 
allows banks to improve their risk-return tradeoff; however, when geographic diversification 
goes further up, this positive effect turns out to be negative. The marginal effect of geographic 
diversification on profitability and risk-adjusted return is positive and significant for both 
intrastate and interstate diversification.17We also highlight a significant effect of geographic 
diversification on bank risk. Expansion in new counties or new states reduces banks’ earnings 
volatility and banks’ default risk. While the relationship between intrastate diversification and 
bank risk (earnings volatility and default risk) is linear, we highlight a U-shaped relationship 
between interstate diversification and banks’ earnings volatility; the marginal effect is negative 
and significant. As argued above, non-linearity in the impact of geographic diversification 
could be explained by higher costs (agency costs and learning costs) faced by banks as they 
become more geographically-diversified. Whereas geographic expansion might improve the 
risk/return tradeoff at the first stages of diversification, spreading across more and more  
different markets make it more difficult for principals (executive managers located at the 
headquarter and owners of the bank) to monitor agents (managers of branches located in other 
counties or other states). Learning costs are also higher because of the lack of information 
when entering in a new market (Berger and DeYoung, 2001). Whatever its scope, geographic 
diversification is beneficial for U.S. banks over the period and, on average, U.S. banks might 
                                                          
16
 These tables report results with ROA and SdROA as the profitability and bank risk taking measures 
respectively. Considering ROE and SdROE provides similar findings. Results are available from the authors on 
request.  
17
 For this specification of our baseline model including only the geographic diversification indicator and its 
squared value, the marginal effect is defined as follows: 
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benefit from further intrastate and interstate expansion. Regarding the other explanatory 
variables, we find a positive and significant impact of bank size on profitability and risk-
adjusted returns. Moreover, an increase in bank size reduces bank risk (earnings volatility and 
default risk). Income diversification across interest and non-interest activities increases bank 
risk (volatility of returns and default risk) and reduces risk-adjusted returns. These results are 
in line with those obtained by Apergis (2014), Stiroh (2006) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006). 
Moreover, higher diversification across different loan activities reduces bank profitability. 
Foreign diversification increases the volatility of returns and reduces risk-adjusted returns, 
although at the 10% level only.  
We then question whether the average (non-linear) benefits of geographic 
diversification on risk-adjusted return and bank risk are impacted by differences in bank size 
(Table 4). We find intrastate and interstate geographic diversification to have a different effect 
on risk-adjusted return and bank risk according to bank size. Firstly, we find a hump-shaped 
relationship between intrastate diversification and both profitability and risk-adjusted return 
for small banks which further benefit from lower return's volatility and lower default risk. 
However, we do not find any significant effect of interstate diversification. These results are 
consistent with the U.S banking industry consolidation process which occurred during the 
second part of the 1990s. As pointed out by DeYoung and Hunter (2003), Berger et al. (2004) 
and Emmons et al., (2004), the bulk of mergers are ―mini-mergers‖ which involved 
small/community banks, in most cases located nearby. As these new markets are nearby their 
own local market, small banks do not face sharp increases in monitoring and learning costs. 
Such an expansion allows them to reduce their idiosyncratic risk and to improve their 
risk/return tradeoff. At the other extreme, for very large banks (i.e. with total assets above $10 
billion) we find both intrastate and interstate diversification to improve the risk-return tradeoff 
and to reduce bank risk.18 We find for both intrastate and interstate expansion a hump-shaped 
relationship with risk-adjusted return and a U-shaped relationship with default risk. Moreover, 
a non-linear relationship is also highlighted between intrastate diversification and earnings 
volatility. When considering the sub-sample of systemic banks, we find a hump-shaped 
relationship between intrastate diversification and risk-adjusted return. However, interstate 
                                                          
18
 For intrastate diversification, the effect is significant when using RaROE as a measure of risk-adjusted return. 
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diversification does not affect the risk-return tradeoff of systemic banks. Finally, we do not 
find any significant effect for large banks (those with total assets ranging from $1 billion to 
$10 billion). 
While the marginal effect of intrastate diversification on banks’ risk-adjusted return is 
positive and significant for both small banks and very large banks, this effect is not significant 
for the sub-sample of systemic banks. This result indicates that whilst intrastate expansion is 
still beneficial for small and very large banks in our sample, systemic banks have reached a 
level of geographic diversification such as the benefits of geographic diversification are now 
counterbalanced by their costs. Moreover, our results show that further interstate expansion 
might allow very large banks to reduce their default risk and improve their risk/return tradeoff.  
We also highlight the other sources of diversification to have different effects on risk-adjusted 
returns and risk according to bank size
19
. While income diversification reduces risk-adjusted 
returns and increases risk for small banks, more diversification across interest and non-interest 
activities improves the risk/return tradeoff of very large banks which further benefit from a 
reduction in their default risk. Finally, foreign diversification significantly increases large 
banks’ risk-adjusted returns, but does not impact the risk/return tradeoff of very large banks.  
Our results clearly highlight non-linearity in the impact of geographic diversification. 
Whereas at one extreme, intrastate geographic expansion positively impacts small banks’ risk-
adjusted return and reduces their risk, at the other extreme, very large banks fully benefit from 
both intrastate and interstate diversification. But, in between, geographic diversification does 
not appear to be beneficial. Such limits in the benefits of geographic diversification for larger 
banks are consistent with the findings of Deng and Elyasiani (2008) who highlight a reduction 
in BHC value and an increase in bank risk with higher distance between headquarter and 
branches. Similar conclusions are highlighted by Goetz et al. (2013) who show that higher 
geographic diversification due to interstate deregulation is associated with a reduction in BHC 
value.  
   
4. 3 Geographic diversification and disparities in economic conditions within and 
across states  
                                                          
19
 The results are not reported in the paper but are available from the authors on request. 
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We now focus on the influence of disparities in economic conditions on the actual 
geographic diversification benefits by looking at the coefficients of the geographic 
diversification indexes interacted with the corresponding disparity indicator.   
Considering first the whole sample of banks, the benefits of geographic diversification 
(in terms of profitability) across counties (GD1) and across states (GD2) are reduced, when 
disparities in economic conditions within states increase (GD*SdUNEMP negative and 
significant) (Table 5). However, as the level of interstate diversification increases, we 
highlight a reversed effect (GD
2
*SdUNEMP positive and significant), although only at the 10 
percent level. For intrastate diversification, in the presence of higher disparities, returns on 
assets do not as highly benefit from diversification and such a result holds for either initially 
low or high levels of diversification (GD
2
*SdUNEMP not significant). The marginal effect of 
intrastate expansion on risk-adjusted return remains positive and significant. However, when 
comparing this value for both specifications of our baseline model (i.e. including or not the 
effect of disparities of economic conditions), the effect is smaller when taking into account the 
influence of economic disparities.  
We take our investigation further by assessing potential differences across bank size 
(Table 6). For small banks, while higher disparities in economic conditions within states 
(between counties) or between states does not shape the relationship between geographic 
diversification and risk-adjusted returns, the benefits of intrastate diversification in terms of 
bank risk are impacted and these effects are non-linear. At the first stages of diversification, 
larger disparities in economic conditions further reduce earnings volatility (GD*SdUNEMP is 
negative and significant), allowing small banks to fully benefit from increased geographic 
diversification. However, as the level of intrastate diversification increases, this effect is 
reduced (GD²*SdUNEMP is positive and significant). The marginal effect of intrastate 
diversification on bank risk remains negative and significant. For very large banks, we find 
disparities in economic conditions to impact risk-adjusted returns and bank risk; however, the 
marginal effect is not significant.  
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4.4 Other issues and robustness checks20  
 To investigate the possible influence played by the global financial crisis, we conduct all 
our estimations over the 2007-2008 period. All in all, the results are unclear and do not yield 
specifically different outcomes. They however indicate that the benefits of diversification are 
apparently weaker during these two troubled years. The results of the regressions on the whole 
sample of banks (small and large) no longer show any significant impact of geographic 
diversification on risk-adjusted return. Nevertheless, intrastate diversification still affects risk-
taking and default risk but interstate diversification no longer matters.  A closer investigation 
using the different size sub-samples shows that small banks no longer benefit from 
diversification in terms of risk-adjusted return although their risk is still reduced. Regarding 
large banks (with assets ranging from $1 billion and $10 billion) intrastate diversification is 
effective in reducing risk-adjusted return but there's no significant impact of interstate 
diversification. Because of data limitations the estimations could not be carried out for the 
very large and systemic banks.   
 Our initial sample includes both BHC and non-BHC commercial banks. For robustness, 
we exclude non-BHC banks and run the regressions on a sample restricted to BHCs. Our main 
findings remain the same. 
 We also consider an alternative measure of intrastate diversification that counts the 
individual MSAs separately, but treats all non-MSA counties as a single entity, giving us 380 
entities in total. Economic fluctuations may indeed be similar in adjacent rural counties and 
therefore spreading that way may not yield much diversification. While we still do not find 
any significant effect for large banks, both small and very large banks benefit from 
diversification across MSA counties. Expanding in new MSAs allows small banks and very 
large banks to reduce their risk (earnings volatility and default risk); very large banks further 
benefit from an improvement of their risk/return tradeoff. 
 As discussed in Goetz (2012), the decision to expand activities across counties or across 
states might not be strictly exogenous and therefore correlated with past and possibly current 
realizations of the errors term in equation (1). To deal with endogeneity issues, we estimate 
equation (1) using the instrumental variables method (IV). To instrument our geographic 
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 The results of these estimations are not reported but are available from the authors on request. 
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diversification measure (GD1 and GD2) and their squared value, we use the lagged values of 
both our geographic diversification measures and their squared values. We also use indicators 
which enable us to account for differences, across U.S. states, in intrastate and interstate 
branching restrictions. For our intrastate diversification indicator (GD1) we include the 
number of elapsed years since a state first started to remove its intrastate branching restrictions 
(Goetz (2012)). For our interstate diversification measure, we use the index of interstate 
branching restrictions computed by Rice and Strahan (2010). Indeed, the Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act contained provisions which granted states the right to erect 
roadblocks to branch expansion. These differences in regulatory barriers across states could 
have affected bank competition and bank geographic diversification behaviors. Using this set 
of instruments, the results are similar to those obtained with the OLS estimator.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 This paper contributes to the literature on bank diversification by focusing on the benefits 
of geographic diversification. Since 1994, U.S. banks have strongly expanded their activities 
across counties and across states. Our findings clearly highlight some benefits from being 
present in more counties within the same state as well as across states. We use detailed data 
spanning the period 1994, when the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act was introduced, to 
2006, prior to the global financial crisis and also separately investigate the two years of the 
peak of the crisis (2007-2008). We consider bank geographic diversification from the extreme 
case of institutions with operations limited to a single location (individual Metropolitan 
Statistical area (MSA) or individual county) to the case where customers are reached 
nationwide. While (either intrastate or interstate) geographic diversification is, on the whole, 
beneficial in terms of risk-adjusted return, the effects are non-linear and depend on bank size. 
While at first stages of diversification spreading across counties or across states improves 
banks’ risk-adjusted return, this positive effect turns out to be negative when geographic 
diversification moves further up. Moreover, whatever its scope, geographic expansion 
significantly reduces bank risk. Our results indicate that, on average, both small banks (i.e. 
with total assets below $1 billion) and very large banks have still not reached their optimal 
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diversification level. Further expansion across new counties may therefore improve their risk-
return tradeoff and reduce their risk. Expanding activities towards markets with different 
economic conditions, as measured by the dispersion in  unemployment rates, impacts the 
benefits of diversification. Greater disparities in economic conditions amplify the effect of 
intrastate diversification on small banks’ risk. 
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Table 1.1 Intrastate and Interstate diversification of U.S. banks1 
 
 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
GD1 0.138 0.232 0 0.978 0 0 0 0.245 0.500 0.852 
GD2 0.0135 0.0758 0 0.918 0 0 0 0 0 0.481 
N 65381          
1994  
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
GD1 0.104 0.211 0 0.955 0 0 0 0 0.477 0.823 
GD2 0.00923 0.0647 0 0.856 0 0 0 0 0 0.438 
N 5074          
2006 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
GD1 0.190 0.261 0 0.962 0 0 0 0.405 0.610 0.876 
GD2 0.0229 0.0979 0 0.916 0 0 0 0 0 0.551 
N 4248          
1 From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: 
across states geographic diversification index; N: number of observations; pi: ith percentile. 
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Table 1.2 Descriptive statistics - Whole sample 1 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
Bank-level variables 
ROA 0.0115 0.00506 -0.0111 0.0283 0.00574 0.00867 0.0114 0.0144 0.0177 
ROE 0.115 0.0498 -0.0399 0.265 0.0554 0.0827 0.113 0.146 0.181 
SdROA 0.00202 0.00203 0.000129 0.0165 0.000445 0.000784 0.00142 0.00249 0.00424 
SdROE 0.0201 0.0187 0.00175 0.127 0.00454 0.00783 0.0141 0.0253 0.0429 
RaROA 10.11 7.355 0.894 34.62 2.654 4.590 7.977 13.70 21.13 
RaROE 9.713 6.711 1.143 31.16 2.769 4.594 7.865 13.13 19.99 
Z 121.8 127.0 5.320 923.1 25.43 44.18 80.75 148.2 264.2 
GD1 0.138 0.232 0 0.978 0 0 0 0.245 0.500 
GD2 0.0135 0.0758 0 0.918 0 0 0 0 0 
INCOME 0.249 0.0910 0 0.500 0.137 0.185 0.242 0.307 0.372 
FOREIGN 0.000834 0.0167 0 0.500 0 0 0 0 0 
LOAN 0.691 0.109 0 1.000 0.549 0.654 0.722 0.763 0.789 
CREDIT_RISK 0.00263 0.00632 -0.139 0.455 -0.000290 0.000196 0.00122 0.00322 0.00689 
EQUITY 0.105 0.0348 -0.0150 0.767 0.0737 0.0826 0.0962 0.117 0.147 
LIQUID_RISK 0.737 0.0928 0.00223 0.979 0.620 0.688 0.751 0.802 0.839 
log(TA) 11.38 1.252 6.957 20.38 9.964 10.56 11.27 12.03 12.85 
State and country level macroeconomic variables 
SdUnempSt 1.879 1.191 0 9.157 0.771 1.096 1.624 2.403 3.287 
SdUnempCtry 2.497 0.554 1.761 3.260 1.973 1.981 2.163 3.103 3.159 
GROWTH 0.0495 0.0623 -0.0364 0.379 0.00580 0.0183 0.0340 0.0542 0.0858 
N = 65381 n = 6532         
1 From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 
3-year window standard deviation of ROA ; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-
score; GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification index across 
interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; 
CRED_RISK: Net charges off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets; Log(TA): natural logarithm of 
Total assets (TA); N: number of observations; n: number of banks; pi: ith percentile.  SdUnempCtry: Standard deviation of unemployment rates across the states at time t; 
SdUnempSt: Standard deviation of unemployment rates across the counties of a given state s at time t; GROWTH: rate of growth of (real) gross domestic product of a given 
state s at time t.  
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Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics –Small banks (Total Assets ≤ $1 billion) 1 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
ROA 0.0115 0.00509 -0.0111 0.0283 0.00567 0.00861 0.0114 0.0143 0.0178 
ROE 0.114 0.0497 -0.0399 0.265 0.0548 0.0818 0.111 0.144 0.179 
SdROA 0.00205 0.00204 0.000129 0.0165 0.000452 0.000796 0.00143 0.00251 0.00428 
SdROE 0.0202 0.0188 0.00175 0.127 0.00455 0.00787 0.0142 0.0255 0.0430 
RaROA 10.00 7.309 0.894 34.62 2.622 4.541 7.870 13.53 20.90 
RaROE 9.609 6.658 1.143 31.16 2.744 4.546 7.772 12.96 19.75 
Z 121.0 126.6 5.320 923.1 25.28 43.81 80.11 147.2 262.5 
GD1 0.124 0.215 0 0.917 0 0 0 0.204 0.491 
GD2 0.00720 0.0509 0 0.686 0 0 0 0 0 
INCOME 0.245 0.0887 0 0.500 0.136 0.183 0.239 0.302 0.364 
FOREIGN 0.000388 0.0119 0 0.500 0 0 0 0 0 
LOAN 0.690 0.109 0 1.000 0.546 0.653 0.721 0.762 0.789 
CREDIT_RISK 0.00262 0.00639 -0.139 0.455 -0.000315 0.000181 0.00118 0.00319 0.00694 
EQUITY 0.105 0.0350 -0.0150 0.767 0.0739 0.0829 0.0968 0.118 0.148 
LIQUID_RISK 0.741 0.0889 0.00293 0.979 0.628 0.692 0.753 0.803 0.840 
log(TA) 11.24 1.016 6.957 13.81 9.945 10.53 11.22 11.92 12.61 
N = 62999 n = 6370         
1 From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 
3-year window standard deviation of ROA; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; 
GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification index across interest and 
non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; CRED_RISK: Net 
charges off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets; Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); 
N: number of observations; n: number of banks; pi: ith percentile. 
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Table 1.4 Descriptive statistics – Large banks ($1 Billion <Total assets < $10 Billion) 1 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
ROA 0.0125 0.00401 -0.00993 0.0276 0.00791 0.0104 0.0125 0.0147 0.0172 
ROE 0.143 0.0437 -0.0394 0.265 0.0916 0.117 0.142 0.171 0.198 
SdROA 0.00142 0.00147 0.000129 0.0162 0.000309 0.000565 0.000987 0.00175 0.00283 
SdROE 0.0167 0.0152 0.00175 0.127 0.00440 0.00681 0.0121 0.0207 0.0340 
RaROA 12.99 8.018 0.895 34.27 4.019 6.680 11.25 18.10 25.37 
RaROE 12.46 7.422 1.146 31.08 3.910 6.559 10.88 17.32 23.64 
Z 145.7 137.6 6.182 921.3 34.01 56.84 100.4 184.6 321.4 
GD1 0.489 0.335 0 0.978 0 0.144 0.561 0.800 0.886 
GD2 0.140 0.209 0 0.861 0 0 2.22e-16 0.253 0.485 
INCOME 0.338 0.0910 0.0306 0.500 0.213 0.275 0.345 0.405 0.456 
FOREIGN 0.00625 0.0406 0 0.496 0 0 0 0 0 
LOAN 0.722 0.0929 0.0234 0.965 0.612 0.693 0.746 0.781 0.800 
CREDIT_RISK 0.00277 0.00375 -0.0159 0.0630 0.000232 0.000922 0.00196 0.00344 0.00581 
EQUITY 0.0894 0.0233 0.0467 0.289 0.0692 0.0769 0.0855 0.0960 0.109 
LIQUID_RISK 0.647 0.123 0.00223 0.895 0.498 0.582 0.664 0.731 0.785 
log(TA) 14.74 0.898 13.59 17.44 13.84 14.02 14.46 15.26 16.14 
N = 2403 n = 427         
1 From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 
3-year window standard deviation of ROA; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; 
GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification index across interest and 
non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; CRED_RISK: Net 
charges off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets; Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); 
N: number of observations; n: number of banks; pi: ith percentile.   
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Table 1.5 Descriptive statistics – Very large banks (Total assets ≥ $10 Billion) 1 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
ROA 0.0133 0.00294 0.00409 0.0257 0.0102 0.0115 0.0133 0.0149 0.0164 
ROE 0.157 0.0303 0.0576 0.236 0.124 0.141 0.158 0.178 0.190 
SdROA 0.00172 0.00137 0.000203 0.00613 0.000389 0.000777 0.00128 0.00215 0.00395 
SdROE 0.0195 0.0169 0.00184 0.0872 0.00389 0.00747 0.0140 0.0262 0.0485 
RaROA 11.56 7.473 1.576 34.52 3.291 5.780 9.475 15.92 22.65 
RaROE 12.15 7.844 1.648 30.95 3.436 5.497 10.53 18.41 23.58 
Z 106.3 92.13 12.43 520.1 23.65 44.98 73.09 135.2 248.2 
GD1 0.752 0.277 0.0173 0.970 0.130 0.674 0.896 0.936 0.951 
GD2 0.577 0.275 0 0.918 0.0535 0.423 0.690 0.789 0.846 
INCOME 0.452 0.0423 0.275 0.500 0.391 0.432 0.461 0.489 0.498 
FOREIGN 0.0919 0.155 0 0.500 0 0.000379 0.0205 0.0902 0.439 
LOAN 0.772 0.0575 0.597 0.940 0.684 0.748 0.781 0.799 0.834 
CREDIT_RISK 0.00480 0.00393 -0.000339 0.0206 0.00131 0.00233 0.00353 0.00617 0.00980 
EQUITY 0.0854 0.0158 0.0563 0.163 0.0675 0.0752 0.0839 0.0950 0.104 
LIQUID_RISK 0.523 0.128 0.120 0.757 0.359 0.471 0.550 0.597 0.662 
log(TA) 18.31 0.783 17.32 20.38 17.51 17.73 18.11 18.67 19.70 
N = 172 n = 30         
1 From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 
3-year window standard deviation of ROA; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; 
GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification index across interest and 
non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; CRED_RISK: Net 
charges off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets; Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); 
N: number of observations; n: number of banks; pi: ith percentile.   
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Table 1.6 Descriptive statistics – Systemic banks (Total assets ≥ $50 Billion) 1 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
ROA 0.0131 0.00300 0.00409 0.0257 0.00973 0.0114 0.0130 0.0147 0.0159 
ROE 0.154 0.0315 0.0576 0.236 0.115 0.137 0.155 0.171 0.192 
SdROA 0.00186 0.00145 0.000203 0.00613 0.000506 0.000813 0.00142 0.00235 0.00419 
SdROE 0.0218 0.0179 0.00184 0.0872 0.00470 0.00797 0.0160 0.0300 0.0515 
RaROA 10.62 7.045 1.576 34.52 2.910 5.460 8.731 14.39 21.20 
RaROE 11.45 7.918 1.648 30.95 3.030 5.030 8.980 17.47 23.01 
Z 101.0 94.64 12.43 520.1 21.20 39.93 68.06 133.6 225.0 
GD1 0.763 0.289 0.0173 0.958 0.118 0.787 0.904 0.936 0.951 
GD2 0.631 0.257 0 0.918 0.185 0.585 0.744 0.805 0.853 
INCOME 0.461 0.0367 0.275 0.500 0.409 0.444 0.468 0.491 0.498 
FOREIGN 0.103 0.168 0 0.500 0 0.00286 0.0216 0.0973 0.487 
LOAN 0.779 0.0579 0.611 0.940 0.682 0.759 0.784 0.814 0.840 
CREDIT_RISK 0.00540 0.00424 0.0000120 0.0206 0.00163 0.00258 0.00417 0.00656 0.0122 
EQUITY 0.0856 0.0171 0.0563 0.163 0.0656 0.0744 0.0833 0.0951 0.106 
LIQUID_RISK 0.507 0.137 0.120 0.728 0.314 0.450 0.547 0.590 0.656 
log(TA) 18.57 0.736 17.74 20.38 17.80 18.00 18.30 18.98 19.80 
N = 129 n = 25         
1 From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 
3-year window standard deviation of ROA; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROE ; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-
score; GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification index across 
interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; 
CRED_RISK: Net charges off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets; Log(TA): natural logarithm of 
Total assets (TA); N: number of observations; n: number of banks; pi: ith percentile.   
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Table 2.1: Correlation matrix (GD1) 1  
 
  GD1 GD1² Log(TA) SIZE INCOME FOREIGN LOAN CREDIT_RISK EQUITY LIQUID_RISK 
GD1 1          
GD1² 0.950 1         
Log(TA) 0.500 0.523 1        
SIZE 0.122 0.170 0.920 1       
INCOME 0.207 0.212 0.323 0.277 1      
FOREIGN 0.0160 0.0180 0.162 0.178 0.0844 1     
LOAN 0.165 0.160 0.193 0.147 0.259 0.0218 1    
CREDIT_RISK 0.0125 0.0150 -0.00526 -0.0117 0.0829 0.0266 0.0199 1   
EQUITY -0.174 -0.150 -0.227 -0.182 -0.262 -0.0240 -0.185 -0.0329 1  
LIQUID_RISK -0.110 -0.116 -0.359 -0.361 -0.0779 -0.205 -0.00946 -0.0357 -0.152 1 
1 From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD1²: 
squared value of GD1; Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); SIZE: orthogonalized value of log (TA) with GD1 as measure of geographic diversification; 
INCOME: diversification index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification 
index across major loans categories; CRED_RISK: Net charges off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core 
deposits/Total assets. 
 
Table 2.2: Correlation matrix (GD2) 1 
 
 GD2 GD2² Log(TA) SIZE INCOME FOREIGN LOAN CREDIT_RISK EQUITY LIQUID_RISK 
GD2 1          
GD2² 0.948 1         
Log(TA) 0.440 0.419 1        
SIZE 0.274 0.261 0.984 1       
INCOME 0.179 0.169 0.323 0.311 1      
FOREIGN 0.0983 0.0914 0.162 0.154 0.0844 1     
LOAN 0.0719 0.0684 0.193 0.193 0.259 0.0218 1    
CREDIT_RISK 0.0170 0.0188 -0.00526 -0.00901 0.0829 0.0266 0.0199 1   
EQUITY -0.0719 -0.0599 -0.227 -0.229 -0.262 -0.0240 -0.185 -0.0329 1  
LIQUID_RISK -0.151 -0.141 -0.359 -0.354 -0.0779 -0.205 -0.00946 -0.0357 -0.152 1 
1 From 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). GD2: across state geographic diversification index; GD2²: squared value of GD2; 
Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); SIZE: orthogonalized value of log (TA) with GD2 as measure of geographic diversification; INCOME: diversification index 
across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; 
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CRED_RISK: Net charges off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets.  
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Table 3: Benefits of geographic diversification of U.S. banks 
This table reports the regression results of our baseline model from fixed-effects models using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GEODIV) from 1994 (Interstate 
Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). Explained variables are ROA, SdROA, RaROA and RaROE and Z. GD1 measures intrastate diversification and GD2 measures 
interstate diversification. Other control: other control variables presented in section 3.5. N: number of observations; n: number of banks. Marginal effect: the marginal effect is calculated as the first 
derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic diversification index computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index. NS: not significant.R2: adjusted R 
squared. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. 
 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00621*** 5.933** 6.058*** -0.00210*** 0.671** 0.00352** 6.776* 10.47*** -0.00274*** 1.145*** 
 (6.12) (2.51) (2.70) (-3.39) (2.39) (2.45) (1.84) (2.83) (-3.22) (2.64) 
GEODIV² -0.00637*** -5.029* -4.512 0.00120 -0.290 -0.00210 -6.269 -15.21** 0.00254* -0.547 
 (-5.18) (-1.66) (-1.53) (1.52) (-0.79) (-0.87) (-0.89) (-2.15) (1.71) (-0.66) 
SIZE 0.00182*** 1.787*** 1.420*** -0.000810*** 0.322*** 0.00155*** 1.603*** 1.393*** -0.000771*** 0.297*** 
 (10.99) (5.66) (4.94) (-8.01) (7.80) (10.00) (5.41) (5.09) (-8.13) (7.63) 
INCOME 0.000207 -5.473*** -5.549*** 0.00246*** -1.173*** -0.0000224 -5.600*** -5.568*** 0.00250*** -1.191*** 
 (0.37) (-5.87) (-6.34) (7.96) (-9.53) (-0.04) (-6.03) (-6.40) (8.06) (-9.71) 
FOREIGN -0.00139 -9.956* 1.187 0.00429* 0.204 -0.000841 -10.01* 0.0607 0.00449* 0.346 
 (-0.36) (-1.89) (0.23) (1.84) (0.26) (-0.22) (-1.87) (0.01) (1.88) (0.43) 
LOAN -0.00117** -0.382 -0.339 0.000101 -0.00904 -0.00120** -0.430 -0.387 0.000113 -0.0138 
 (-2.06) (-0.37) (-0.36) (0.30) (-0.07) (-2.11) (-0.42) (-0.41) (0.34) (-0.10) 
GROWTH 0.00204*** 0.883 0.611 -0.000666*** 0.295** 0.00204*** 0.882 0.618 -0.000666*** 0.294** 
 (4.79) (0.75) (0.57) (-2.87) (2.39) (4.79) (0.75) (0.57) (-2.86) (2.38) 
SdUnempSt 0.0000242 -0.153* -0.118 0.0000357 -0.0185* 0.0000201 -0.155* -0.117 0.0000362 -0.0185
* 
 (0.58) (-1.69) (-1.35) (1.51) (-1.70) (0.48) (-1.71) (-1.34) (1.53) (-1.69) 
EQUITY 0.0411*** 25.77*** 4.028 -0.00667*** 8.627*** 0.0405*** 25.25*** 3.871 -0.00662*** 8.578*** 
 (17.73) (7.12) (1.22) (-5.65) (17.79) (17.33) (7.00) (1.18) (-5.60) (17.69) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.00115** -2.804** -1.677 0.000716** -0.518*** -0.00144** -2.992*** -1.707* 0.000765** -0.545*** 
 (-2.04) (-2.56) (-1.62) (2.28) (-3.73) (-2.57) (-2.74) (-1.66) (2.44) (-3.94) 
CREDIT_RISK -0.252*** -184.9*** -174.5***   -0.252*** -184.9*** -174.5***   
 (-25.59) (-15.97) (-14.64)   (-25.56) (-15.96) (-14.64)   
Constant 0.00880*** 11.97*** 12.17*** 0.00225*** 3.854*** 0.00957*** 12.65*** 12.80*** 0.00199*** 3.927*** 
 (12.54) (8.85) (9.76) (5.78) (23.02) (14.02) (9.71) (10.75) (5.35) (24.58) 
Other control           
Time effects           
N 61976 43506 42009 49607 50517 61976 43506 42009 49607 50517 
N 6272 6111 6088 6173 6178 6272 6111 6088 6173 6178 
R2 0.157 0.0291 0.0271 0.0209 0.0372 0.155 0.0290 0.0271 0.0208 0.0371 
Marginal effect 0.0044*** 4.50*** 4.76*** -0.0017*** 0.589*** 0.003** 6.60** 10.05*** -0.002*** 1.13*** 
z-statistic 6.18 2.79 3.17 -4.13 3.07 2.51 1.88 2.85 -3.27 2.73 
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Table 4: Geographic diversification and bank size   
This table reports the regression results of our baseline model when including only geographic diversification index and its squared-value across four sub-samples of bank size (small banks (TA ≤ 
$1B); large banks ($1B  < TA < $10B); very large banks (TA ≥ $10B) and systemic banks (TA ≥ $50B)) from fixed-effects models using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic 
diversification (GEODIV) from 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). Explained variables are ROA, SdROA, RaROA, RaROE and Z. GD1 measures 
intrastate diversification and GD2 measures interstate diversification. Other variables: other explanatory and control variables presented in section 3.5. N: number of observations; n: number of banks. 
Marginal effect: the marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic diversification index computed using the average value of the 
geographic diversification index. NS: not significant. R2: adjusted R squared. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. 
 
Small banks (TA ≤ $1B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00689*** 7.982*** 5.672** -0.00219*** 0.819*** 0.00364 5.204 2.361 -0.00246 0.655 
 (6.09) (3.19) (2.36) (-3.22) (2.74) (1.42) (0.96) (0.43) (-1.30) (0.90) 
GEODIV² -0.00638*** -7.598** -3.368 0.00117 -0.447 0.00168 -0.883 7.830 0.000917 0.795 
 (-4.45) (-2.32) (-1.03) (1.28) (-1.12) (0.29) (-0.07) (0.64) (0.20) (0.45) 
SIZE 0.00213*** 1.955*** 1.633*** -0.00087*** 0.346*** 0.00186*** 1.719*** 1.554*** -0.000817*** 0.317*** 
 (11.29) (5.96) (5.56) (-7.74) (7.84) (10.62) (5.53) (5.48) (-7.78) (7.58) 
Constant 0.00914*** 8.947*** 12.64*** 0.00215*** 3.869*** 0.00998*** 9.975*** 13.39*** 0.00186*** 3.976*** 
 (12.55) (6.54) (9.94) (5.40) (22.70) (14.09) (7.67) (11.02) (4.85) (24.39) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 59860 42038 40556 47852 48711 59860 42038 40556 47852 48711 
N 6133 5912 5892 5979 5986 6133 5912 5892 5979 5986 
R2 0.158 0.0296 0.0273 0.0214 0.0376 0.157 0.0293 0.0272 0.0212 0.0374 
Marginal effect 0.005*** 6.02*** 4.79*** -0.0018*** 0.70*** 
NS NS NS NS NS 
z-statistic     6.45     3.44    2.90     -3.96   3.35 
 
Large banks ($1B < TA < $10B)  
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00543* -9.531 4.122 -0.00287 -0.460 0.000753 4.676 2.166 -0.00168 1.100 
 (1.67) (-0.78) (0.34) (-1.33) (-0.34) (0.24) (0.48) (0.27) (-1.23) (1.08) 
GEODIV² -0.00562** 9.512 -7.902 0.00325 0.143 -0.00173 -9.160 -11.58 0.00308* -1.527 
 (-2.15) (0.79) (-0.67) (1.58) (0.11) (-0.50) (-0.63) (-0.98) (1.77) (-1.03) 
SIZE 0.000809 1.026 -0.851 -0.000228 0.0126 0.000841 1.826 -0.878 -0.000119 -0.0662 
 (1.04) (0.51) (-0.48) (-0.68) (0.06) (0.99) (0.90) (-0.49) (-0.36) (-0.31) 
Constant 0.00542 3.778 0.657 0.00475** 3.824** 0.00616* -0.787 1.473 0.00393** 3.953*** 
 (1.54) (0.32) (0.06) (2.31) (2.49) (1.82) (-0.07) (0.13) (1.97) (2.73) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 2141 1460 1455 1757 1809 2141 1460 1455 1757 1809 
N 378 353 348 368 372 378 353 348 368 372 
R2 0.265 0.0234 0.0295 0.0400 0.0279 0.265 0.0232 0.0298 0.0377 0.0292 
Marginal effect 0.005* 
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
z-statistic 1.67 
 
(Table 4 continued on the next page) 
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Table 4 continued 
 
Very large banks (TA ≥ $10B)  
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV -0.0150 74.22 125.4*** -0.00804* 8.321*** 0.0136* 72.49* 91.63** -0.00859 8.287* 
 (-1.22) (1.46) (3.09) (-1.77) (3.21) (1.92) (1.82) (2.67) (-1.06) (1.84) 
GEODIV² 0.0153* -57.82 -105.1** 0.0126** -8.070*** -0.0146** -50.85 -102.2** 0.00821 -6.676* 
 (1.80) (-1.39) (-2.80) (2.72) (-3.06) (-2.22) (-1.24) (-2.76) (1.23) (-1.75) 
SIZE -0.000802 9.728* 9.438 -0.00155 1.505** -0.000458 8.919 9.943* -0.00101 1.342** 
 (-0.65) (1.75) (1.68) (-1.53) (2.50) (-0.32) (1.58) (1.98) (-1.01) (2.32) 
Constant 0.00762 -151.1* -173.9** 0.0271* -18.31** -0.00118 -143.5* -170.9** 0.0233 -17.01** 
 (0.67) (-1.76) (-2.28) (2.06) (-2.50) (-0.08) (-1.75) (-2.53) (1.64) (-2.30) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 160 116 112 128 131 160 116 112 128 131 
N 24 23 23 23 24 24 23 23 23 24 
R2 0.355 0.189 0.228 0.318 0.276 0.360 0.194 0.302 0.282 0.285 
Marginal effect 
NS NS 
 125.44*** -0.008*    8.321*** 0.013* 72.48* 91.62*** 
NS 
8.28* 
z-statistic 3.09 1.77     3.21      1.92     1.82   2.67 1.84 
 
 
Systemic banks (TA ≥ $50B)  
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV -0.00738 26.17 101.9*** -0.00393 4.276 0.0159 107.5 58.64 0.00234 -6.347 
 (-0.62) (0.76) (3.32) (-0.59) (1.23) (0.56) (0.85) (0.45) (0.10) (-0.68) 
GEODIV² 0.0155 -53.11 -102.7** 0.0159* -7.840 -0.0155 -84.32 -76.46 0.000282 3.593 
 (1.38) (-1.23) (-2.43) (1.73) (-1.53) (-0.70) (-0.94) (-0.88) (0.02) (0.53) 
SIZE -0.000251 9.948 10.60* -0.00202* 1.681** 0.000641 7.191 10.31** -0.00122 1.387** 
 (-0.13) (1.41) (1.76) (-1.87) (2.52) (0.34) (1.05) (2.12) (-1.14) (2.26) 
Constant 0.00132 -106.9 -150.5 0.0253 -16.41 -0.00970 -118.4 -134.5 0.0182 -10.30 
 (0.09) (-0.87) (-1.40) (1.30) (-1.58) (-0.64) (-1.25) (-1.48) (0.89) (-1.14) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 123 94 94 104 106 123 94 94 104 106 
n 21 20 19 20 21 21 20 19 20 21 
R2 0.383 0.216 0.232 0.331 0.253 0.384 0.199 0.298 0.261 0.244 
Marginal effect 
NS NS NS 
0.02 
NS NS NS NS NS NS 
z-statistic 2.13 
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Table 5 Geographic diversification and disparities in economic conditions within and across states 
This table reports the regression results of our baseline model from fixed-effects models using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GEODIV) from 1994 (Interstate 
Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008). Explained variables are ROA, SdROA, RaROA, RaROE and Z. Each measure of geographic diversification is interacted with 
our measure of economic disparities (SDUNEMP). GD1 measures intrastate diversification and GD2 measures interstate diversification. GD1 is interacted with our measure of economic disparities 
within state (SdUnempSt) and GD2 is interacted with our measure of interstate economic disparities (SdUnempCtry). Other control: other control variables presented in section 3.5. N: number of 
observations; n: number of banks. Marginal effect: the marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic diversification index computed using 
the average values of the geographic diversification index and of the economic disparities variable. NS: not significant. R2: adjusted R squared. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. 
 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00621
***
 7.237
**
 7.653
***
 -0.00183
***
 0.738
**
 0.0103
**
 3.508 7.864 -0.00202 1.130 
 (5.17) (2.47) (2.88) (-2.60) (2.23) (2.44) (0.30) (0.73) (-1.09) (0.88) 
GEODIV² -0.00729
***
 -7.375
*
 -7.806
**
 0.000945 -0.415 -0.0143
**
 -0.441 -20.95 0.00369 -1.862 
 (-4.73) (-1.80) (-2.13) (1.03) (-0.94) (-2.05) (-0.02) (-1.03) (1.12) (-0.80) 
SIZE 0.00126
***
 1.805
***
 1.459
***
 -0.000815
***
 0.323
***
 0.00104
***
 1.603
***
 1.431
***
 -0.000779
***
 0.300
***
 
 (9.60) (5.69) (5.10) (-8.03) (7.79) (8.53) (5.38) (5.21) (-8.20) (7.71) 
GEODIV*SDUNEMP -0.000747
**
 -0.728 -0.912 -0.000132 -0.0377 -0.00587
**
 2.449 1.369 -0.000402 -0.0561 
 (-2.20) (-0.81) (-1.17) (-0.71) (-0.41) (-1.98) (0.30) (0.18) (-0.31) (-0.06) 
GEODIV²*SDUNEMP 0.000729 1.276 1.847 0.0000863 0.0696 0.00904
*
 -4.280 6.256 -0.00131 1.194 
 (1.60) (0.86) (1.53) (0.35) (0.51) (1.92) (-0.28) (0.43) (-0.56) (0.72) 
INCOME -0.000339 -5.458
***
 -5.512
***
 0.00246
***
 -1.172
***
 -0.000512 -5.597
***
 -5.567
***
 0.00249
***
 -1.191
***
 
 (-0.61) (-5.86) (-6.30) (7.93) (-9.52) (-0.92) (-6.03) (-6.40) (8.06) (-9.72) 
FOREIGN 0.000127 -9.828
*
 1.740 0.00429
*
 0.210 0.000784 -10.13
*
 2.355 0.00403
*
 0.513 
 (0.03) (-1.90) (0.36) (1.84) (0.27) (0.21) (-1.82) (0.53) (1.78) (0.65) 
LOAN -0.00140
**
 -0.343 -0.286 0.000105 -0.00732 -0.00145
**
 -0.430 -0.388 0.000114 -0.0149 
 (-2.47) (-0.33) (-0.30) (0.31) (-0.05) (-2.54) (-0.42) (-0.41) (0.34) (-0.11) 
GROWTH 0.00299
***
 0.896 0.615 -0.000661
***
 0.295
**
 0.00297
***
 0.879 0.607 -0.000664
***
 0.293
**
 
 (6.93) (0.77) (0.57) (-2.84) (2.39) (6.85) (0.75) (0.56) (-2.86) (2.37) 
SdUnempSt 0.000181
***
 -0.148 -0.131 0.0000481
*
 -0.0185 0.000124
***
 -0.155
*
 -0.117 0.0000362 -0.0185
*
 
 (3.97) (-1.44) (-1.35) (1.73) (-1.50) (3.06) (-1.71) (-1.35) (1.53) (-1.69) 
EQUITY 0.0379
***
 25.84
***
 4.203 -0.00671
***
 8.633
***
 0.0375
***
 25.26
***
 4.035 -0.00666
***
 8.595
***
 
 (17.18) (7.15) (1.27) (-5.68) (17.78) (16.87) (7.00) (1.22) (-5.63) (17.71) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.000178 -2.788
**
 -1.656 0.000716
**
 -0.517
***
 -0.000473 -2.995
***
 -1.672 0.000758
**
 -0.543
***
 
 (-0.33) (-2.54) (-1.60) (2.28) (-3.72) (-0.87) (-2.74) (-1.62) (2.42) (-3.92) 
CREDIT_RISK -0.252
***
 -184.9
***
 -174.6
***
   -0.252
***
 -184.9
***
 -174.5
***
   
 (-25.57) (-15.97) (-14.64)   (-25.54) (-15.96) (-14.64)   
Constant 0.00776
***
 9.163
***
 10.46
***
 0.00223
***
 3.854
***
 0.00848
***
 9.887
***
 11.11
***
 0.00198
***
 3.933
***
 
 (11.00) (6.80) (8.27) (5.73) (23.02) (12.46) (7.71) (9.24) (5.33) (24.62) 
Other control           
Time effects           
N 61976 43506 42009 49607 50517 61976 43506 42009 49607 50517 
n 6272 6111 6088 6173 6178 6272 6111 6088 6173 6178 
R2 0.154 0.0291 0.0272 0.0209 0.0372 0.152 0.0289 0.0272 0.0209 0.0372 
Marginal effect 0.0018*** 2.734* 3.013** -0.0008** NS NS 6.52** 6.82** -0.0016* 0.649* 
44 
z-statistic 2.79 1.97 2.30 -2.03 2.02 2.17 -1.90 1.67 
Table 6: Geographic diversification and disparities in economic conditions within and across states: estimations across bank size  
This table reports the regression results of our baseline model from fixed-effects models using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GEODIV) across four sub-samples of 
bank size (small banks (TA ≤ $1B); large banks ($1B < TA < $10B); very large banks (TA ≥ $10B) and systemic banks (TA ≥ $50B)) from 1994 (Interstate Banking Act) to 2006 (before the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008). Explained variables are ROA, SdROA, RaROA, RaROE and Z. Each measure of geographic diversification is interacted with our measure of economic disparities 
(SDUNEMP). GD1 measures intrastate diversification and GD2 measures interstate diversification. GD1 is interacted with our measure of economic disparities within state (SdUnempSt) and GD2 is 
interacted with our measure of interstate economic disparities (SdUnempCtry). Other variables: other explanatory and control variables presented in section 3.5. N: number of observations; n: number of 
banks. Marginal effect: the marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic diversification index computed using the average value of the 
geographic diversification index and of the economic disparities variable. R2: adjusted R squared. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. 
 
Small banks (TA ≤ $ 1B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00629
***
 7.598
**
 5.033
*
 -0.00145
*
 0.656
*
 0.00943 7.813 22.01 0.00143 1.940 
 (4.62) (2.52) (1.76) (-1.91) (1.84) (1.10) (0.42) (1.27) (0.41) (0.88) 
GEODIV² -0.00653
***
 -6.660 -2.136 0.0000513 -0.137 -0.00454 -11.75 -37.45 -0.00425 -3.869 
 (-3.46) (-1.58) (-0.52) (0.05) (-0.27) (-0.23) (-0.28) (-0.93) (-0.51) (-0.76) 
SIZE 0.00145
***
 1.950
***
 1.630
***
 -0.000876
***
 0.345
***
 0.00123
*** 1.722*** 1.546*** -0.000821*** 0.318*** 
 (9.97) (5.94) (5.54) (-7.76) (7.82) (9.19) (5.54) (5.45) (-7.81) (7.58) 
GEODIV*SDUNEMP -0.000493 0.228 0.350 -0.000382
*
 0.0893 -0.00547 -2.086 -14.93 -0.00288 -1.012 
 (-1.22) (0.26) (0.41) (-1.81) (0.83) (-0.93) (-0.15) (-1.16) (-1.10) (-0.66) 
GEODIV²*SDUNEMP 0.000250 -0.540 -0.654 0.000541
*
 -0.164 0.00458 8.528 34.08 0.00365 3.628 
 (0.40) (-0.40) (-0.48) (1.71) (-0.95) (0.33) (0.29) (1.14) (0.63) (1.05) 
Constant 0.00787
***
 8.929
***
 10.86
***
 0.00212
***
 3.870
***
 0.00865
***
 9.980
***
 11.64
***
 0.00186
***
 3.978
***
 
 (10.74) (6.51) (8.44) (5.33) (22.66) (12.26) (7.67) (9.53) (4.85) (24.40) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 59860 42038 40556 47852 48711 59860 42038 40556 47852 48711 
N 6133 5912 5892 5979 5986 6133 5912 5892 5979 5986 
R2 0.155 0.0296 0.0272 0.0215 0.0376 0.154 0.0293 0.0272 0.0213 0.0374 
Marginal effect 0.003*** 6.057*** 4.843*** -0.002* 
** 
0.716*** 
NS NS NS NS NS 
z-statistic 4.79 3.46 2.92 -4.03 3.39 
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Table 6 continued 
Large banks ($1B < TA < $10B)  
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00411 5.407 8.890 -0.00614** 2.035 -0.00720 -23.80 -47.97* 0.00108 -0.881 
 (1.14) (0.32) (0.61) (-2.51) (1.20) (-1.14) (-0.85) (-1.87) (0.21) (-0.26) 
GEODIV² -0.00624* -12.60 -19.65 0.00762*** -2.552 0.00735 40.19 60.51 0.000938 2.839 
 (-1.67) (-0.70) (-1.36) (2.80) (-1.47) (0.74) (0.86) (1.35) (0.11) (0.46) 
SIZE 0.000194 1.426 -0.419 -0.000287 0.0270 0.000259 1.858 -0.800 -0.000147 -0.0569 
 (0.48) (0.74) (-0.25) (-0.88) (0.13) (0.56) (0.93) (-0.45) (-0.43) (-0.27) 
GEODIV*SDUNEMP -0.000465 -8.318 -2.478 0.00205*** -1.466** 0.00402 21.69 36.62** -0.00200 1.608 
 (-0.34) (-1.37) (-0.51) (2.71) (-2.45) (1.00) (1.13) (2.11) (-0.59) (0.68) 
GEODIV²*SDUNEMP 0.000784 11.76* 6.454 -0.00247*** 1.439** -0.00551 -35.99 -50.17 0.00117 -3.320 
 (0.59) (1.81) (1.31) (-3.10) (2.40) (-0.88) (-1.13) (-1.63) (0.20) (-0.80) 
Constant 0.00719** -0.325 4.159 0.00517** 3.297** 0.00747** -4.272 3.850 0.00408** 3.692** 
 (2.22) (-0.03) (0.35) (2.42) (2.18) (2.45) (-0.35) (0.33) (1.97) (2.45) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 2141 1460 1455 1757 1809 2141 1460 1455 1757 1809 
N 378 353 348 368 372 378 353 348 368 372 
R2 0.239 0.0242 0.0348 0.0392 0.0259 0.239 0.0162 0.0316 0.0285 0.0215 
Marginal effect NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
z-statistic 
 
Very large banks (TA ≥ $10B)  
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV -0.0271 130.2*** 136.1 -0.0209** 16.09*** 0.00518 384.5** 418.6* -0.0580* 46.28** 
 (-1.48) (3.16) (1.61) (-2.71) (3.42) (0.38) (2.78) (1.84) (-1.98) (2.42) 
GEODIV² 0.0260 -112.0*** -115.0 0.0251*** -15.68*** -0.0210 -315.7** -378.5* 0.0508 -42.95** 
 (1.68) (-3.22) (-1.39) (3.36) (-3.73) (-1.59) (-2.56) (-1.85) (1.71) (-2.28) 
SIZE -0.000704 10.88* 9.458 -0.00168 1.646** 0.0000723 10.75 13.14* -0.00147 1.793** 
 (-0.56) (1.79) (1.34) (-1.54) (2.55) (0.05) (1.53) (2.04) (-1.17) (2.68) 
GEODIV*SDUNEMP 0.00804 -39.32 -11.30 0.0111** -5.076* 0.00471 -168.4** -175.3 0.0269 -20.76** 
 (1.59) (-1.29) (-0.28) (2.39) (-1.80) (0.66) (-2.32) (-1.56) (1.71) (-2.07) 
GEODIV²*SDUNEMP -0.00671 34.78 9.075 -0.00937** 4.653* 0.00516 148.5** 154.9 -0.0240 20.70* 
 (-1.46) (1.42) (0.25) (-2.48) (1.93) (0.62) (2.25) (1.47) (-1.39) (1.97) 
Constant 0.0109 -169.2* -177.4* 0.0301** -20.51** -0.00170 -181.7* -225.5** 0.0305* -22.14** 
 (0.94) (-1.87) (-1.91) (2.11) (-2.53) (-0.14) (-2.04) (-2.63) (1.89) (-2.63) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 160 116 112 128 131 160 116 112 128 131 
N 24 23 23 23 24 24 23 23 23 24 
R2 0.362 0.190 0.211 0.338 0.286 0.392 0.225 0.326 0.298 0.310 
Marginal effect 
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
z-statistic 
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Systemic banks (TA ≥ $ 50B)  
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV -0.0131 -29.40 49.53 -0.00997 4.596 0.0164 322.7* 566.4** -0.0859** 53.72* 
 (-0.64) (-0.65) (0.38) (-0.65) (0.59) (0.30) (2.09) (2.87) (-2.15) (1.93) 
GEODIV² 0.0183 -7.996 -60.91 0.0201 -8.098 -0.0366 -269.8* -530.4** 0.0790* -51.85* 
 (1.17) (-0.17) (-0.58) (1.44) (-1.07) (-0.81) (-1.75) (-2.84) (2.05) (-1.84) 
SIZE -0.000191 9.256 10.03 -0.00199* 1.684** 0.000832 10.04 17.05*** -0.00243** 2.216*** 
 (-0.10) (1.14) (1.39) (-1.75) (2.31) (0.48) (1.12) (3.12) (-2.15) (3.18) 
GEODIV*SDUNEMP 0.0153* 27.30 26.81 0.00511 -0.169 0.00608 -167.3 -351.7*** 0.0645*** -41.24*** 
 (2.02) (0.64) (0.39) (0.58) (-0.04) (0.41) (-1.34) (-3.21) (3.92) (-2.87) 
GEODIV²*SDUNEMP -0.0109 -26.17 -25.06 -0.00416 0.157 0.00836 142.4 314.7*** -0.0565*** 37.73** 
 (-1.58) (-0.77) (-0.42) (-0.56) (0.04) (0.54) (1.18) (2.92) (-3.18) (2.45) 
Constant 0.0105 -86.54 -142.1 0.0278 -17.01 -0.0100 -139.2 -200.2* 0.0270 -17.69 
 (0.91) (-0.66) (-1.17) (1.41) (-1.54) (-1.14) (-1.14) (-1.97) (1.25) (-1.58) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 123 94 94 104 106 123 94 94 104 106 
n 21 20 19 20 21 21 20 19 20 21 
R2 0.416 0.199 0.213 0.318 0.234 0.436 0.215 0.388 0.353 0.336 
Marginal effect 
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
z-statistic 
 
